In this note we investigate, for non-convex finite economies, the relationship between the existence of approximate core allocations and the size of an economy.
Introduction
The existence of approximate equilibria for exchange economies whose agents have non-convex preferences was established by Starr (1969) . For a stronger concept of approximate equilibria the existence result was obtained by Hildenbrand, Schmeidler and Zamir (1973) (HSZ hereafter). Moreover, it was shown in HSZ, that the approximation can be made as good as one likes by choosing the number of agents in the economy large enough.
Under assumption of completeness of preferences, the analogous existence result for approximate cores was also obtained in HSZ. In a consequent paper Grodal(l976) has extended this result to the non-complete case.
In a recent contribution Anderson (1982) proved a 'rate-of-convergence' theorem for approximate equilibria in the framework of quite general sequences of finite exchange economies, including those se-quences considered in HSZ. A special case of Anderson's result was proved subsequently by Weber (1980) for the sequences of HSZ by modifying arguments given already there.
In this note we establish a relationship between the existence of approximate core allocations and the size of a non-convex economy. The result is directly related to the previous papers by HSZ and Grodal (1976) .
To obtain our proposition the only additional assumption we need is a cone-monotonicity of preference relations which is defined below.
Model
We follow HSZ very closely, and all notations, assumptions and definitions, except of C-monotonicity, are reproduced from there. Let T denote an infinite set of potential traders. For every t E T there are defined: 
A.2. Uniform boundedness of initial endowments.
There is a positive real number M such that w, < Me for all t in T, where e denotes the unit vector (l,... [Recall that C is a proper cone if
A preference relation is C-monotone on a set A c R!+ if it is C-monotone at x for every x E A. A preference relation is C-monotone if it is C-monotone on R\ . Now denote for any X E (0, 1) and i E { 1,2,. . . ,I } the vector i -x ,...) -h, 1 It is shown in Schmeidler (1969) that II/ is well defined and, by the monotonicity assumption, px =pw, holds for all x in $(f, p). An exchange economy is by definition a finite subset, say E, of T. An allocation for the economy E is a collection {x, },EE of elements of R: satisfying E:rGE(X, -w,) = 0.
In order to state our proposition we need the following:
Definition 2. Let e > 0 and an economy E be given. Then the e-core of E is defined to be the set of all allocations {x, },EE, such that there do not exist a non-empty subset S of E and an allocation { J,~YI)(~~ for E satisfying (i) yt >tx, for every r E S,
(]A] denotes the cardinality of a set A, and for any x, y E R!+ the vector whose j th coordinate is max{ 0, x J -y'} for all 1 <j 6 1 is denoted x8y.)
Proposition. be satisfied and S > 0. Suppose that for any n E N there is II X, > 0 so that euety +, is C,,n-monotone on [0, n] 
P'),~~ of allocations and of prices in S, such that for each n E N and each t E E, one has p"x: =p"w, and p(x:, #(t,p"))= O(l/lE,I). (For x E Rt and A c R', p(x, A) denotes inf,,,, II x -y II).

This Lemma due to Weber (1980) is a corollary of Theorem 2 in Anderson (1982).
Consider the following two statements concerning an irreflexive preference relation > : 
Then we can state:
Claim I. (i) implies that (ii) holds for every X < l/(1 -l)(fiK + 1).
Claim 2. (ii) implies that (i) holds for K > 4fi/X.
Proof of Claim 1. Assume (i) is satisfied and consider x E Rt+, u E C,\ {0}, where h < l/(1-l)(fiK + 1). Then, u = Cf,,G,ei for some S, >, 0. Leti3=max _ ,_t . ...,, 6, > 0. Now definey' = x + u and assume thaty' E Rt+ . We have to prove that y' > x. Therefore define v E Rt+ by v, = max (O, 6, --X&+,6,) for i= l,..., I and let y = v + x. Then, IIY -x II = II u II >, S -X(1 -1)6. Moreover Since X G l/(1 -l)( Kfi + l), we have that Consequently, as y 2 x, we have by (i) that x + u r x. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume (ii) and consider x, y, x', y' E R!+ such y#.x, y>x, and max(tly-y'II, . . ,l) (clearly y' > y' and X' > x'). Note that y > x implies that y, > x,, for all 1 < h < I, and there exists i, 1 < i < I, such that y, > x, + II y -x II/J~.
Therefore, we have that y' > 2' + (II y -x 11/d)(0, 0,. . . ,l, 0,. . . , 0) -2(ll y -x It /K)(i,.
. . , 1). Let
Consider u E R'. where
Since 4&/K < X < 1, we conclude that u E C,\ (0). Consequently, since _v' > X' + u > X' + (II y -x ll/2fi)u, it follows that y' -2' E C,. As, moreover, y' E R!+ and y' # x', we obtain that y' Y-x'.-Q.E.D.
Proof of the proposition.
Let S > 0 and let a sequence of economies {%)ncNwith&E, W, > 1 E,, ISe be given. Then, by the lemma, there exist an independent constant H and sequences {{x: lIEEm, pn }ncN of allocations and prices, so that for each n E N and each t E E,, one has p"x: =p"w, and p(x:, $(t,p"))< (Y,,, where (Y, = H/IE,I. Let 9 = 77(6/2) be determined by Lemma 2 of HSZ. Denote by Q a minimal integer, which exceeds M/2. Let B be a cube [O,Q] ' and X, > 0, so that each preference relation >, , t E T, is a C,o-monotone on B. Consider an economy E,,, which belongs to the above sequence of economies.
Suppose x, y, x', y' E R\, y > x, lly -x II = (4fi/~p)a,. Then by Claim 2, max( 11 x -x' II , II y -y' II) < a,, implies that y' >I~' for any tE E,. Denote j3, = (4\/7/Xa)aR and en = 2&/77(6/2) = (2/17(6/2))(4J7/X,)(H/IE,I).
Thus, applying the standard arguments used in Grodal (1976) we conclude that an economy E, has a non-empty en-core, and this completes the proof of proposition.
Q.E.D.
Remark.
Let us note, that although for any h > 0 every CA-monotone preference relation is strongly monotone, but for given h > 0, a strongly monotone preference relation cannot, in general, be approximated by a sequence of C-,-monotone preference relations. This can be illustrated by the following:
Example.
Let x>O. 
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